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THE NLRB: WHAT WENT WRONG AND SHOULD WE TRY
TO FIX IT?
Julius G. Getman∗
For eighty years, national labor policy as set forth in the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) has been committed to overcoming the “inequality of
bargaining power between employees . . . and employers” by “encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining” and by “protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives.”1 The basic tenants of national policy may be
restated in terms of a series of commands directed at the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) and the courts. These may be stated as
follows:
1. Promote and protect the right of workers to organize for the
purposes of collective bargaining.
2. Prevent employers from using their economic power to inhibit free
choice by workers.
3. Leave the parties free to negotiate their own agreements.
4. Recognize and protect the right to strike.
The key to turning these commands into a living reality was the establishment
of the NLRB, an expert agency that was to use its understanding of labor
relations reality to establish national labor policy by defining more precisely
the general terms of the NLRA subject to minor and supportive review by the
courts.
When the law was first enacted, its drafters probably assumed that the
Court would be instructed in the realities of labor relations by the newly
established NLRB and its presumed expertise. That has failed to happen, in
part because the expertise of the Board is largely fictional and because the
Court regularly ignores and overrides even sensible Board opinions.

∗
1

Earl E. Sheffield Regents Chair Emeritus, University of Texas at Austin School of Law.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
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This positive vision of an expert Board and a supportive Court has been
supplanted by the reality of an activist Court, ignorant of labor relations,
making key policy decisions, many in conflict with the basic concepts of the
NLRA. The Board has become a controversial, often politicized, agency whose
best efforts are denounced by politicians and often overruled by the Supreme
Court.
The greatest problem for unions today is organizing. The Supreme Court
has played a major role in constructing the current system under which
employers have immediate and constant opportunity to make the case against
unions to its employees, and the NLRB is forbidden to grant union organizers
the right to come on an employer’s parking lot to speak to employees. In its
Jean Country decision, the Board attempted a sensible and modest effort to
balance Section 7 rights of employees with property rights of employers.2 In its
key ruling on access, Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court rejected the
Board’s effort to balance “the degree of impairment of the Section 7 right [to
organize] if access should be denied” against “the degree of impairment of the
private property right if access should be granted.”3 The Supreme Court denied
the Board the ability to employ such a balancing test primarily on the ground
that “[b]y its plain terms . . . the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not
on unions or their nonemployee organizers.”4 The value to the employees of
learning the union’s arguments in favor of organization is barely mentioned.
Indeed, paying almost no respect to the concept of informed choice, the Court
said that it would be enough if the employees knew that there was a campaign.
In the study that I did with Professors Goldberg and Brett, we were able to
measure campaign familiarity and, not surprisingly, discovered a major
employer advantage based on attendance at meetings.5
In the early days of the Wagner Act, the Court, by way of dictum, declared
that employers could not only hire replacement workers to do the work of
strikers but were entitled to give them employment rights superior to strikers,
without regard to seniority or business needs.6 The Court has regularly
reaffirmed this dictum without examining either the need for it or how it can be
2

See Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988).
502 U.S. 527, 536 (1992) (quoting Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. at 14).
4 Id. at 532.
5 JULIUS G. GETMAN, STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG & JEANNE B. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY (1976); Stephen B. Goldberg, Julius G. Getman & Jeanne M. Brett, Union
Representation Elections: Law and Reality: The Authors Respond to the Critics, 79 MICH. L. REV. 564 (1981).
6 See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co.,
304 U.S. 333 (1938).
3
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reconciled with the oft stated policy of insulating job rights from union
activity. Thus, Justice O’Connor was able to state accurately that employees
who strike in support of union bargaining positions “gamble” their jobs.7 And
despite ample precedent for treating picketing as a form of free speech in other
contexts, the Court has continued to enforce restrictions on peaceful picketing
when undertaken by unions. The Court has regularly upheld provisions of the
law denying workers the right to appeal, either to customers or other workers,
for support.8 To further limit union economic power, the Court has narrowed
the broad language of Section 7 by excluding from its coverage tactics that the
Court, with no basis in the statutory language, decides are “disloyal” or
“indefensible.”9
Nor has the Court supported the process of collective bargaining. By its
decision in H.K. Porter, denying to the Board the power to effectively remedy
employer failures to bargain in good faith, the Court has given encouragement
to the widespread practice by employers of refusing to come to agreement with
newly certified unions.10
The Court’s decisions have been marked by bias combined with ignorance
of labor relations realities and a consistent willingness to assume critical facts.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in its opinions structuring the law’s
relationship to arbitration. The Court’s initial effort to put the law behind the
successful system of dispute resolution, developed through collective
bargaining, seemed a positive development. But it was apparent from the first
opinions that the Court misunderstood the nature of the process, the expertise
of arbitrators, and the goals and understandings of the parties.11 The Court’s
untutored enthusiasm for the process inevitably led to its transformation from a
system of private ordering to a system by which basic rights were adjudicated
through an inferior process. And the Court soon turned its support for the
process into a reason for limiting the right to strike.12 Most worrisome has been
the Court’s unquestioning support of private agreements under the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).13 The Court has plainly suggested that, under its
misguided interpretation of the FAA, employers will be permitted to use
7

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 438–39 (1989).
E.g., NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
9 E.g., NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
10 H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
11 Bernard D. Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Arbitrability and Collective Bargaining, 28 U. CHI. L. REV.
464 (1961).
12 See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
13 E.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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standard form contracts to limit employee rights and access to courts and
agencies.14
In sum, the Supreme Court has played a major role in transforming the
NLRA from a law meant to empower workers to a law that helps to sustain the
power of employers. What went wrong?
First, it was unrealistic to expect any meaningful deference from the
Supreme Court to the Board. Second, the Board has played a major role in its
demise and is not blameless in the failure of the Act to achieve the goals of its
drafters. The Board has done little to acquire significant understanding of labor
relations—its doctrines have been relentlessly legalistic and its vision of
employee behavior patronizing. It has devoted an enormous amount of time
and energy in an effort to regulate the contents of employer speech. I believe
based on considerable amount of data and interviews with hundreds of
employee voters that this effort is futile. Employee perception of threats does
not vary significantly, if at all, with content, and those who perceive threats are
most likely to vote in favor of unionization.
More and more scholars, lawyers, and union officials question the structure
of the law. Is the NLRB an idea whose time has passed? Some union leaders
have urged repeal of the NLRA.15 The impulse is understandable, but the idea
of returning labor law to the states seems likely to make the law more confused
and even more unfavorable to workers and unions.
I believe the proposal with the greatest potential to help unions was the
Work Place Fairness Act, which by overturning the Mackay doctrine would
have helped to revitalize the strike weapon.16 Not only would it have prevented
the terrible unfairness of workers losing their jobs for behaving as the Act
contemplates, but such a law would deprive employers of what many
organizers consider their most effective argument, i.e., some version of the
following: “If you unionize, I will bargain hard to protect this enterprise. The
only way the union can force me to make concessions is by pulling you out on
strike. If you strike, I can permanently replace you.” And I believe it would be
relatively easy to win the battle for public opinion, by emphasizing the
testimony of replaced strikers and their families. In addition, the simple
14

See id.
See, e.g., Harry Bernstein, Creativity Needed to Stem Unions’ Decline, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1989, at
C1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1989-09-19/business/fi-266_1_union-leaders.
16 See Workplace Fairness Act of 1999, H.R. 1980, 106th Cong. (1999); see also NLRB v. Mackay
Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
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argument that a worker should not lose her or his job because they act as the
law contemplates is relatively easy to defend and capable of appealing to the
public’s general sense of fairness.
Even now with the unfriendly Roberts Court, there is hope for positive
change through carefully selected litigation. In particular, an appeal to
recognize the First Amendment rights of union picketers might succeed. The
current Court has found First Amendment rights in corporations, money, and
hateful picketing.17 It might feel compelled to include union picketers in its
ambit.
Another area calling out for change, which might be possible without
substantial changes in the Court or Congress, is the composition and role of the
NLRB. The status of the Board is at a low ebb in the wake of decades of
judicial activism and, at best, limited deferral to its rulings. The Court’s disdain
for the Board in effect invited the courts of appeals to anticipate rejection of
Board decisions and doctrines, even those that are soundly reasoned and
faithful to the basic policies of the law. Nowhere is this more evident than in
the refusal by the courts of appeals to accept the thoughtful analytically sound
decision by the Board in D.R. Horton.18 Instead, the courts of appeals are
looking to the Supreme Court’s Concepcion ruling for guidelines concerning
the legitimacy of employment contracts limiting joint action.19
While the courts have taken charge of establishing labor policy, the role of
the Board has withered. The Board is partly to blame for its diminished role. It
has interpreted the statute inconsistently and with little understanding of the
consequences of its myriad of technical rules. At times, the Board has either
lost sight of or sought to limit unnecessarily the rights it was intended to
vindicate. The sadly diminished role of the NLRB has made it a safe target for
false charges and misleading political rhetoric, as happened when the Board’s
General Counsel, following precedent, issued a complaint against Boeing Co.
for moving an assembly line for its 787 Dreamliner to South Carolina in
retaliation for passed strikes.20 The General Counsel’s decision was attacked
17 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443
(2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
18 D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. No. 184, 2012 WL 36274 (Jan. 3, 2012).
19 See, e.g., D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 358–60 (5th Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care,
Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1054 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[N]early all of the district courts to consider [D.R. Horton]
have declined to follow it.” (citing cases)).
20 Complaint and Notice of Hearing, Boeing Co., Case No. 19-CA-32431 (NLRB Region 19 Apr. 20,
2011), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-3310/cpt_19-ca032431_boeing__4-20-2011_complaint_and_not_hrg.pdf.
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by politicians, academics, and conservative publications throughout the
country, even though Boeing had basically announced that its move was
retaliatory from the first moment.21
The Board is appointed by the President, whose choice is invariably
political and aimed at reassuring one side or the other of his or her concern for
their interests. The political process by which the Board is constituted
automatically establishes that the Board will not be an impartial, consistent
decider entitled to the respect of the courts that will review its decision. The
process would work far better if the President were required to make his or her
choice from among those who have established themselves as respected labor
management neutrals, such as members of the National Academy of
Arbitrators. The current process of review by the circuit courts, whose attitudes
vary from circuit to circuit, also ensures a variety of different rules in different
areas. A special labor review court or limiting review to the District of
Columbia Circuit would help to restore a sense of a consistent, truly national
labor relations law. There is great need for change but little hope in the present
climate that sensible voices will prevail.

21 Julius G. Getman, Boeing, the IAM, and the NLRB: Why U.S. Labor Law Is Failing, 98 MINN. L.
REV. 1651 (2014).

